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Analysis of 21 emerging European economies reveals a substantial role for do-
mestic ﬁnancial reforms in attracting net capital ﬂows. Controlling for standard
determinants of capital ﬂows, we ﬁnd in particular banking sector reforms to be
consistent with larger current account deﬁcits and net ﬁnancial inﬂows, whereas
opposite or no eﬀects are found for security market reforms as well as for indicators
of ﬁnancial depth. Additional net inﬂows are reaped by the EU accession countries.
Banking reforms are found to have a signiﬁcant impact on FDI and “other” invest-
ment net inﬂows; they have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on gross ﬁnancial inﬂows, but not
on outﬂows.
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11 Introduction
Over the last decade, emerging European economies were able to run persistent cur-
rent account deﬁcits, whereas emerging Asian and the oil exporting countries ran current
account surpluses. This has invoked diﬀerent hypotheses as to global current account im-
balances: a frequently mentioned explanation is the ineﬃciency of the ﬁnancial systems
in emerging economies (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2007; Ju and Wei, 2006). A
related argument is that emerging economies seek high quality assets of industrial coun-
tries (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2006; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull, 2008).
Both arguments support the ‘saving’s glut hypothesis’ (Bernanke, 2005, 2007) and explain
the persistent current account surpluses of ﬁnancially underdeveloped emerging countries;
they also give reason to why the United States are the main recipient of international cap-
ital ﬂows. However, studies such as Lane (2008) and Hermann and Winkler (2008) report
that the new EU accession countries were able to receive substantial net ﬁnancial inﬂows
in recent years.
This paper examines the role of ﬁnancial development for this unique European expe-
rience. More speciﬁcally, we analyse if countries with more developed ﬁnancial systems
attract net capital inﬂows, that is, are able to run bigger current account deﬁcits.1 While
the standard (medium-term) determinants of current account patterns have been promi-
nently established by Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Gruber and Kamin (2007), there is
no consensus yet on the role of domestic ﬁnancial systems for international capital ﬂows.
Financial development comprises two crucial concepts: ﬁnancial liberalisation and
ﬁnancial deepening (Agca, De Nicolo, and Detragiache, 2007). Financial liberalisation
refers to a lower degree of government involvement, and a subsequently more market based
ﬁnancial system. Financial deepening, on the other hand, refers to increases in volumes
of markets (such as increases in market capitalisation and liquidity). Both can move hand
in hand, but Agca et al. (2007) mention examples where the two are independent.2
This paper, in a novel approach to the international capital ﬂows literature, will not
only consider volume-based measures of ﬁnancial deepening, but also ﬁnancial liberalisa-
tion as a result of ﬁnancial policy reforms. The rationale for this is two-fold: ﬁnancial
reforms, implying enhanced, market based ﬁnancial systems, may attract higher ﬁnancial
ﬂows contemporaneously; furthermore ﬁnancial reforms can be regarded as a promise for
larger and deeper capital markets in the future. Detragiache and Tressel (2008) ﬁnd that
reforms have indeed led to more ﬁnancial deepening in the banking sector provided that
the legal and institutional framework is functioning. Both dimensions of ﬁnancial devel-
opment matter for international as well as for domestic investors, hence aﬀecting gross
and net ﬁnancial ﬂows.
In order to analyse the role of ﬁnancial development for net capital inﬂows in Emerging
Europe in a comprehensive way, we include measures of ﬁnancial reforms, ﬁnancial depth,
and various indicators of ﬁnancial integration. In particular, we consider two categories of
1The standard measure for net ﬁnancial inﬂows is the current account balance. See Section 2.2 for
potential diﬀerences between current account balances and net ﬁnancial inﬂows.
2France in the 1970s had deep, but repressed ﬁnancial markets, whereas Argentina exhibited liber-
alised, but shallow markets in the 1990s.
2ﬁnancial reforms: banking sector and security market reforms. Moreover, heterogeneous
eﬀects of ﬁnancial development on diﬀerent investment categories (in particular on FDI)
as well as on gross inﬂows and outﬂows are examined. Our paper uses an index maintained
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2007), focusing on
the years 1989 - 2007 and including 29 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE),
South-Eastern Europe (SEE), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
The driving forces behind ﬁnancial reforms (these are for example liberalisations in
credit or interest controls and the privatisation of the banking sector) were analysed by
Abiad and Mody (2005), who developed a new index on ﬁnancial reforms which was sub-
sequently extended by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008).3 Abiad and Mody (2005)
ﬁnd balance of payments crises, falling global interest rates, path dependency, regional
leaders, and trade openness (for the least developed countries) to be positive factors to-
wards ﬁnancial reforms, whereas banking crises are a negative inﬂuence. Additionally,
ﬁnancial reforms have a political economy dimension as government action is needed to
implement them. Mishkin (2007) suggests that governments have a self-interest in a
state-owned banking sector.4
Campos and Kinoshita (2008) ﬁnd that gross FDI inﬂows are strongly aﬀected by
ﬁnancial sector reforms. But theoretically the eﬀect on net capital ﬂows is a priori am-
biguous. For example, reforms rendering an economy more attractive to domestic as well
as foreign investors can lead to increased inﬂows and less outﬂows, thereby lowering the
current account. On the other hand, reforms promoting ﬁnancial sector development may
foster domestic savings and domestic investment. This could reduce the need for foreign
funds by encouraging suﬃcient domestic savings, thereby reducing net inﬂows.
For a sample of European and Asian emerging economies, Hermann and Winkler
(2008) report that deeper and more integrated ﬁnancial markets are beneﬁcial in order
to receive net capital inﬂows. In particular, the CEE countries were able to run large
current account deﬁcits over the last decade, leading to rapid convergence with the EU
countries in output and living standards. Brezigar-Masten et al. (2007) ﬁnd non-linear
growth eﬀects of ﬁnancial development for less developed European countries, whereas
the eﬀects of international ﬁnancial integration are only signiﬁcant beyond a threshold
level of ﬁnancial development. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b) point out the importance
of FDI inﬂows for the CEE countries. Hermann and Winkler suggest that predominantly
high levels of FDI in the banking sectors of the CEE group are a key factor for receiving
high levels of capital inﬂows.
The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 2008) presents evidence closely related
to our research: the authors’ analysis concludes that the importance of ﬁnancial liberali-
3Past advances in measuring ﬁnancial liberalisation include Edison and Warnock (2003), who construct
an “investable” equity index as a measure for intensity of capital controls, Kaminsky and Schmukler
(2003) who develop an index focusing on stock market regulations as well as international transactions,
and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), who determine dates of equity market liberalisations and
ﬁnd a subsequent positive eﬀect on economic growth.
4Rajan and Zingales (2003) state that incumbents in ﬁnancial and industrial sectors oppose ﬁnancial
reforms (which only changes if the economy is open to trade and capital ﬂows). Bartolini and Drazen
(1997) come to the conclusion that reforms are likely if access to international capital is facilitated.
3sation (as measured by the reforms index of Abiad et al.) is highest for the CEE countries,
which they attribute to the strong presence of foreign banks in the region. Abiad, Leigh,
and Mody (2007) show that for the sub-sample of new European Union member states,
increasing ﬁnancial integration leads to receiving down-hill capital ﬂows from the richer
European countries, thereby facilitating convergence in European income levels. Lane
(2008) attributes this to the multi-dimensional character of the institutional anchor pro-
vided by European Union membership, which has eliminated many of the barriers to
international capital ﬂows that are still faced by other emerging market economies.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section two the dataset is
presented, followed by the empirical strategy in Section three. The results are presented
in Section four, and Section ﬁve concludes.
2 Data
2.1 EBRD Data On Financial Reforms
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) publishes data on
ﬁnancial sector reforms as part of its annual Transition Report (EBRD, 2008). This report
assesses emerging economies against the standards of industrialised market economies, and
provides reform scores to reﬂect the assessments of EBRD country economists.5
For this paper, two scores are relevant: 1. banking reforms and interest rate liberal-
isation and 2. securities markets and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions. In both of these
categories, scores range from one to four (where four implies the highest degree of im-
plemented reforms).6 This allows use of an unweighted ﬁnancial reforms index as well as
separate component-indices.
Regarding banking reforms, the lowest scores are allocated to countries with little
progress beyond the establishment of a central bank and commercial banks, whereas
high scores imply the (full) adoption of BIS standards as well as functioning banking
competition and supervision.
Reforms of securities markets and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions refer to working,
private security exchanges as well as the emergence of private investment and pension
funds, and regulation that meets the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions’s (IOSCO) standards.7
2.2 Other Data Sources
In this paper we use both current account and ﬁnancial account data in order to determine
net ﬁnancial inﬂows. These data were retrieved from the IMF’s International Financial
5See Appendix A2 for a list of countries captured in the Transition Report.
6The EBRD economists also use incremental scores of 0.33 and 0.66 (for example 2.33 to indicate 2+).
As can be seen in the Appendix, full adoption of highest international standards would results in a 4+,
thus a value of 4.33. However, the highest score given for our sample of countries is four.
7See Appendix A1 for a detailed description by the EBRD about its way of scoring.
4Statistics (IFS) and Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS).8 In the multilateral inter-
national capital ﬂows literature, focus is almost exclusively put on current accounts to
measure net ﬁnancial inﬂows. The reason is the Balance of Payments Identity, which
states that the current account is equal (with sign reversed) to the capital and ﬁnancial
account (provided that there are no errors and omissions, IMF, 1993).9 As it is our goal
to consider ﬁnancial inﬂows and outﬂows separately as well as net balances from the dif-
ferent investment categories, we also analyse ﬁnancial account data. In the IMF’s (1993)
deﬁnition, the ﬁnancial account is the net change in foreign ownership of investment as-
sets. It is divided into direct investments, portfolio investments, other investments, and
reserve assets transactions. Thus, given the above stated identity, the diﬀerence between
the current and ﬁnancial accounts is the capital account, which reports the transfer of
capital goods and other capital transfers such as debt forgiveness.
In order to explore the role of foreign direct investments (FDI) further, we use BOPS
data which distinguishes between equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other direct
investment capital. Another source of FDI data is the UNCTAD database. It not only
publishes overall FDI ﬁgures, but also data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&As).
Updated data from the External Wealth of Nations dataset (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2007a) provide information on the external ﬁnancial positions of our sample countries.
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators supply us with data on exports and
imports, the age-dependency ratio, and GDP per capita. From the EBRD transition
dataset, we obtain data on ﬁscal balances and GDP growth. Data on stock market
capitalisation are retrieved from Datastream and Standard and Poor’s, whereas banking
deposits data come from IFS.
Data on measures of ﬁnancial openness are employed, namely the ratio of the sum
of foreign assets and liabilites to GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007a) as a de-facto
measure and updated de-jure data by Chinn and Ito (2008). Furthermore, we include
BIS data on consolidated foreign claims of Euro Area banks on the respective transition
country as a percentage of GDP of the recipient countries. We use the share of foreign
banks (and the share of banking assets held by foreign banks) as provided by Claessens et
al. (2008). Banking and currency crisis indicators are obtained from Laeven and Valencia
(2008).
In a set of estimations on net capital inﬂows (with a particular focus on FDI), we
use further transition indicators from the EBRD (2008). We construct a measure of
privatisation (as an unweighted average of large scale and small scale privatisation scores),
and use an overall infrastructure indicator (covering electric power, railways, roads, and
telecommunications) and a corporate governance and enterprise restructuring indicator.
The scoring system used by the EBRD is the same as for the ﬁnancial reform variables.10
8For an overview of the other variables used in the analysis, refer to Appendix A3.
9In general, the term capital account is often used to describe what the IMF deﬁnes as the combined
“capital and ﬁnancial account”.




As is common in this literature (for example, Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Gruber and Kamin,
2007), we focus on medium-term ﬂuctuations of current accounts. The main purpose of
this is to avoid short-term cyclical factors blurring the estimations.
We employ panel data techniques with non-overlapping three-year averages for each
country and variable. By least squares we run the following reduced form model
CAYit = α + δt + βXit + γYit + φZit + eit (1)
where CAYit is the current account to GDP ratio, Xit includes standard current account
determinants, Yit includes ﬁnancial reforms indicators, and Zit comprises ﬁnancial deepen-
ing and integration variables.11 Furthermore, we run regression speciﬁcations employing
gross inﬂows and outﬂows, and net inﬂows as dependent variables, respectively. This al-
lows for analysis of capital ﬂows across diﬀerent investment categories and disentangling
potential diﬀerences in the investment behaviour of foreign and domestic agents.
We include heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors as well as time dummies to allow
the average current account position to vary over time and to control for global factors
inﬂuencing all countries in our sample. In the main speciﬁcations, we abstain from using
country ﬁxed eﬀects, as our focus is on explaining cross-country variations.
In order to work with a balanced panel of appropriate country coverage in both the time
and cross-sectional dimensions, we average over three-year periods. Our panel comprises
the years 1995 to 2006, such that we include 19 countries and four time periods. With
regard to our particular sample of transition countries, this time frame is appropriate
as it follows much of the convergence process of these economies, but without including
a potential transition bias due to the strong impact of shifting from planned to market
economies (in the period from 1990 to 1994).
3.1.2 Annual Data
As a robustness analysis, we also employ annual data. As shown by Chinn and Prasad
(2003), results at annual frequency are comparable to medium-term results, but tend to
be less precise. Similar to the medium-term analysis, we estimate
CAYit = αi + δt + βXit + γYit + φZit + eit (2)
where eit = ρeit−1+zit. Thus, we include an AR(1) correction term and heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors as well as country and year dummies. As such, we put more
emphasis on within-country developments over time.
11See Section 3.2 for details about these variables.
63.1.3 Cross-Section
Additionally, we consider pure cross-sectional results in order to capture long-term eﬀects
on current account positions. In the cross-section, we use full-sample averages of each
country over the time period 1996 to 2006. Hence, we run
CAYi = α + βXi + γYi + φZi + ei (3)
where we employ heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. This cross-sectional approach
allows for comparing structural inﬂuences on net capital ﬂows by smoothing short-term
ﬂuctuations. Furthermore, by capturing countries which are at diﬀerent stages of economic
development, we are able to make inferences about changes in the response to, for example,
the ﬁnancial development variables over time.
3.2 Theoretical Issues
Our method follows the approaches of Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Gruber and Kamin
(2007). These papers establish standard medium-term determinants of current account
balances: an important factor is a country’s ﬁscal balance. Overlapping generations
models as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) suggest a redistribution of future income to
current generations by means of ﬁscal deﬁcits, thus leading to increased current account
deﬁcits. Non-Ricardian behaviour implies that economic agents do not oﬀ-set government
budget surpluses by less private savings (particularly in liquidity-constrained developing
countries, as shown by Bussiere, Fratzscher, and Mueller, 2004).
Chinn and Prasad (2003) also ﬁnd that a country’s net foreign asset (NFA) position
aﬀects its net investment position and hence the current account. Thus, the lagged
value of the NFA position is used in regression analysis in order to avoid correlation
with the present current account balance. In order to account for a life-cycle theory of
consumption and savings, we use the age-dependency ratio, implying that relatively young
and old countries are more likely to run current account deﬁcits. Following Chinn and
Prased (2003), we include real GDP per capita in the estimations in order to capture
the dynamics of relatively poorer countries needing more foreign capital, whereas richer
countries are able to export capital.12 The degree of trade openness (deﬁned as the sum
of exports and imports over GDP) might be seen as a signal of being better equipped to
generate export revenue in order to pay oﬀ external debt (Chinn and Prasad, 2003). The
(lagged) GDP growth rate is included because it might trigger increased capital inﬂows
from foreign investors who want to reap beneﬁts (higher returns) from economic growth
periods.
Various papers have extended these standard estimations by including measures of
ﬁnancial development in order to contribute to the current account imbalances literature.
Considering evidence of the medium-term impact of domestic ﬁnancial development on
international capital ﬂows, the focus of research has been foremost on the ﬁnancial deep-
12Speciﬁcally, countries that are below their steady state output are expected to be net importers of
capital.
7ening dimension. Chinn and Ito (2005) point out that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening on
current accounts is ambiguous: theoretically, it can induce higher savings through more
developed ﬁnancial markets, but on the other hand there could be less savings due to a de-
crease in the precautionary savings rate. Furthermore it could lead to increased ﬁnancial
inﬂows by attracting more foreign savings and thus stimulating domestic investments.
There is no conclusive empirical evidence to date on the impact of ﬁnancial deepening
indicators on current account balances.13 Commonly used indicators of ﬁnancial depth
are stock market capitalisation as well as private credit measures (Gruber and Kamin,
2007; Chinn and Ito, 2005). In line with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), we include bank
deposits (as a ratio to GDP) in order to capture the size of a country’s banking system.
The role of domestic ﬁnancial reforms is also not clear a priori. A more developed
ﬁnancial system might improve access to foreign funds (thus lowering the current account)
and enhance allocative eﬃciency (Abiad, Oomes and Ueda, 2004), thereby leading to
better investment opportunities. Alternatively, there could be a decreased need for foreign
funds as better intermediation opportunities arise from a reformed ﬁnancial system (IMF,
2008). The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 2008) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant negative
impact of ﬁnancial reforms (however, without disentangling the eﬀect of entry barriers to
foreign investors) on current account balances for a sample of countries from Emerging
Europe, whereas no signiﬁcant role for ﬁnancial depth is found.
We also run estimations including measures of ﬁnancial openness, both de-facto (Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007a) and de-jure (Chinn and Ito, 2008). We expect more ﬁnancial
openness to be associated with larger current account deﬁcits to reﬂect better borrowing
opportunities abroad.
In line with Hermann and Winkler (2008), we measure the degree of ﬁnancial inte-
gration with the Euro Area countries (proxied by the consolidated foreign bank claims of
Euro Area reporting banks on the respective countries in Emerging Europe) and include
the share of foreign-owned banks and foreign-owned banking assets from Claessens et al.
(2008). Again, one expects more ﬁnancial integration to be negatively correlated with the
current account balance. Moreover, we include a banking and currency crisis indicator
(Laeven and Valencia, 2008) as the risk of ﬁnancial crises is expected to lead to lower
levels of ﬁnancial inﬂows.14
13Chinn and Prasad (2003) ﬁnd an increase in current account balances due to ﬁnancial deepening (as
measured by M2), Chinn and Ito (2005) report larger current account deﬁcits due to ﬁnancial deepening
(measured as private credit) interacted with legal system indicators, while Gruber and Kamin (2008)
ﬁnd no evidence of a ﬁnancial deepening eﬀect (as measured by bank assets and stock market variables)
on current account balances. Employing annual data, Hermann and Winkler (2008) report evidence of
larger current account deﬁcits due to ﬁnancial deepening (as measured by M2 and private credit) as well
as measures of ﬁnancial integration and openness for Emerging Asia and Emerging Europe.
14To be more speciﬁc, we use a dummy variable which has a value of one when the country experiences




The medium term analysis reveals that among the standard determinants of current
accounts, the ﬁscal balance stands out (Table 1): in all estimations it signiﬁcantly in-
creases current account surpluses. Thus, as usually observed in the literature, we see
non-Ricardian behaviour of the transition countries. Furthermore, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evi-
dence that the level of international trade raises current account deﬁcits (columns 1 to 3),
hence contributing to higher net capital inﬂows. Among the other standard determinants,
only modest evidence is found: initial net foreign asset positions do not inﬂuence current
accounts, whereas richer countries exhibit higher current account positions (columns 3
and 5).
Turning to the aggregate unweighted ﬁnancial reforms index, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
decline of current account balances (at the 10% level) implying a beneﬁcal role of more
liberalised ﬁnancial systems in attracting net ﬁnancial inﬂows. In column (2), we disen-
tangle the eﬀects of banking and security market reforms. Strikingly, these reforms have
opposing eﬀects on current account balances. Banking sector reforms signiﬁcantly increase
net ﬁnancial inﬂows (as indicated by the negative sign), whereas security market reforms
point in the opposite direction (signiﬁcant at the 1% level and 5% level, respectively).
As a next step, we examine what eﬀect ﬁnancial deepening, thus a volume-increase
in the ﬁnancial system, has on current account balances. For the banking sector, we
use the ratio of banking deposits to GDP, but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence (column 3);
for security markets, we use stock market capitalisation (as a ratio to GDP), and again
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect on current account balances.15 The inclusion of stock market
capitalisation renders the security reform coeﬃcient insigniﬁcant.
Finally, we use the complete set of ﬁnancial variables in column (5): the previously ob-
tained results persist, reinforcing the important role of banking sector reforms in running
larger current account deﬁcits.
In all estimations, we employ an EU membership dummy for the respective countries
and time periods after EU accession. In columns (4) and (5), we ﬁnd a beneﬁcial eﬀect
on the EU dummy indicating that those transition countries which joined the European
Union received additional net inﬂows. This ﬁnding is in line with Lane (2008) who suggests
that the “multi-dimensional institutional anchor” associated with EU membership has
facilitated access to international capital ﬂows.
Table 2 shows results for further potential determinants of current account balances.
The variables used in this part of the analysis primarily reﬂect international ﬁnancial
integration and were partially also employed in recent studies by Hermann and Winkler
(2008) and the IMF (2008).16 In column (1), we use a measure of de-facto international
15It is crucial to include a measure of country size (in our case the log of population) in the estimations
including stock market capitalisation, as small countries are less likely to have sizeable stock markets.
16Due to data availability for the ﬁnancial integration indicators, the number of observations varies by
9ﬁnancial integration (as deﬁned by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007a), but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the current account balance. The same holds true for the Chinn-Ito index of de
jure ﬁnancial openness in column (2). In the next three columns, we include measures
of (regional) ﬁnancial integration, namely the share of foreign banks, the share of foreign
owned bank assets, and the ratio of Euro Area owned banking claims to GDP, respectively.
Among these variables, we ﬁnd the share of foreign bank ownership to lower current
account balances signiﬁcantly (at the 10% level). In all of these regressions, the main
results of Table 1 persist; in particular, the banking reform index proves to be robust to
the inclusion of any other ﬁnancial integration measures.17
4.1.2 Net Inﬂows
In Table 3, we examine net inﬂows of diﬀerent investment categories with respect to
the set of standard determinants and ﬁnancial development indicators as deﬁned above.
Considering the number of observations, we observe that data availability is slightly less
complete for ﬁnancial ﬂows than for current account balances. In column (1), we report
our ﬁndings of Table 1 again, whereas we present in column (2) the same current esti-
mation but only for those countries that also have data available on overall net inﬂows.18
The results in both columns are very consistent in terms of signiﬁcance levels and signs
(with the exception of stock market capitalisation leading to signiﬁcantly larger current
account surpluses in column 2). In the next column, we use net ﬁnancial inﬂows as the
dependent variable. In theory, results in columns (2) and (3) should be equivalent (having
the opposite signs). However, as described in section 2.2, there are deﬁnitional diﬀerences
between current account balances and ﬁnancial ﬂows.
Comparing columns (2) and (3), we still obtain consistent results. Thus, a higher level
of implemented banking reforms and EU membership imply a higher level of net ﬁnancial
inﬂows, whereas higher GDP per capita is associated with less net inﬂows. Moreover,
for net ﬁnancial inﬂows, the coeﬃcients on the lagged net foreign asset position and on
international trade are signiﬁcant (with a positive sign), whereas the coeﬃcient on banking
deposits has a negative sign (signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
In columns (4) to (7), we deal with diﬀerences across investment categories: strikingly,
we do not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant role of either the standard nor the ﬁnancial variables
for portfolio equity. For FDI, there is some evidence that richer countries and countries
with a higher stock market capitalisation receive lower FDI net inﬂows, whereas countries
with a more liberalised and larger banking sector and more openness to trade receive
signiﬁcantly higher net inﬂows. This could reﬂect the participation of foreign banks in the
Eastern European banking system through direct investments. An alternative explanation
speciﬁcation.
17We run additional robustness tests including systemic ﬁnancial crisis dummies (Laeven and Valencia,
2008) which are not found to be signiﬁcant. We also test a more reﬁned demographic speciﬁcation
following Fair and Dominguez (1991) and Higgins (1998) which leaves our ﬁndings unchanged. Moreover,
we drop Russia (as a potential outlier) from all estimations, use country ﬁxed eﬀects, and private credit
as a ratio to GDP (instead of banking deposits), but ﬁnd the results to be unaﬀected in each case.
18In terms of data availability, the diﬀerence arises from the fact that Uzbekistan does not provide data
on ﬁnancial ﬂows.
10is that banking reforms might signal an improved general investment environment. We
will revisit this point in the next subsection. Portfolio debt investments are signiﬁcantly
and negatively aﬀected by the ﬁscal balance, which can be explained by less need of
governments to sell bonds to foreign investors when the ﬁscal position is relatively high. In
the other investment category, we ﬁnd the opposite result for the ﬁscal balance. Crucially,
the banking reform index has a positive impact on net inﬂows in this category. We can
interpret this as a direct eﬀect, since many of the other ﬂows are in the form of banking
loans.
Overall, we ﬁnd evidence that banking reforms work best in attracting FDI and other
investment net inﬂows, whereas we do not ﬁnd security market reforms or stock market
capitalisation to play an important role for any of the investment sub-categories.
4.1.3 Net Inﬂows and Addtional Transition Indicators
As can be seen in Figure 1, FDI plays a crucial role for the sample of transition countries:
overall net FDI inﬂows to the sample of countries are persistently above 2% of overall
GDP. Net positions for portfolio equity and portfolio debt ﬂuctuate around zero, whereas
the other investment category is rather volatile, with relatively high net inﬂows in recent
years.
The analysis in the previous subsection showed the importance of banking sector re-
forms for net FDI inﬂows. Campos and Kinoshita (2008) conﬁrm for Eastern European
and Latin American emerging countries that ﬁnancial sector reforms have a strong pos-
itive eﬀect on gross FDI inﬂows. They suggest that ﬁnancial development is seen as
a precondition for maximising the beneﬁts of a foreign investment. Next to the direct
beneﬁts of raising capital in the host countries, foreign investors might beneﬁt indirectly
from more developed ﬁnancial markets, as local suppliers can avail of better investment
opportunities. Thus, banking reforms can be a signal for a functioning supply chain and
an overall sophisticated economic environment. In the same vein, Alfaro et al. (2004)
suggest that ﬁnancial development helps countries to exploit FDI more eﬃciently.
We consider diﬀerent components of FDI in order to gain additional insights. Using
Balance of Payments data by the IMF allows for the classiﬁcation of FDI into equity
capital, reinvested earnings and other direct investment capital. Figure 2 shows FDI
equity (which is the combined value for equity capital and reinvested earnings) and the
residual classiﬁed as “other”. Overall, one can see the dominant role of FDI equity (with
two lows in 2003 and 2006), and a marked increase in the other category, that is, in other
direct investment capital transactions such as intercompany debt.
Another source of FDI data is the UNCTAD database. It not only publishes overall
FDI ﬂows data, but also data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This
allows to distinguish between M&As and other (or greenﬁeld) investments. M&As refer
to a change in ownership from domestic to foreign investors, while greenﬁeld investments
include all ﬁnancial transfers from a multinational’s headquarters to its foreign subsidiary,
which may be in the form of equity and loan ﬁnancing. In Figure 3 we see a signiﬁcant
increase in mergers and acquisitions net inﬂows from 1998 to 2000 before they fall to
around zero in 2003. After this, there is also an increase in the other category, hinting at
11more greenﬁeld investments.19
In Table 4, we show the same regression speciﬁcation as for net inﬂows in the pre-
vious subsection, but now separate the aforementioned components of net FDI inﬂows.
Strikingly, the results suggest that the impact of a more liberalised banking sector is ho-
mogeneous across the diﬀerent components. As these estimations are still guided by our
extended current account determinants, we use a diﬀerent approach for Table 5. In line
with recent studies on gross FDI inﬂows (among others, Campos and Kinoshita, 2008),
we include structural determinants of FDI ﬂows in order to observe their eﬀects on net
FDI inﬂows and the coeﬃcients of the ﬁnancial variables.
In contrast to the previous estimation, we drop the lagged net foreign asset position and
the age-dependency ratio from the model and incorporate three structural indicators from
the EBRD (2008) instead. We use a measure of privatisation, an overall infrastructure
indicator, and a corporate governance and enterprise restructuring indicator.20 A high
degree of private ownership and suﬃcient infrastructure are potentially important factors
in attracting foreign investors. The eﬀect of improved corporate governance is not that
clear a priori; due to the hold-up problem, ﬁrms might choose FDI instead of outsourcing
if the institutional quality in the host country is low (Antras, 2003), whereas improved
institutional quality can of course also increase FDI inﬂows.
The results in Table 5 show a more diverse picture: overall net FDI inﬂows (column 1)
are still higher for countries with lower GDP per capita and more openness to international
trade. We observe a positive eﬀect of banking sector reforms and larger banking sectors,
whereas the opposite eﬀect is found for stock market capitalisation. Among the newly
included structural determinants of FDI, we see that the eﬀect of corporate governance
reforms is signiﬁcantly negative (at the 5% level), hinting at the existence of the hold-up
problem. In column (2), where we only include the countries for which a disentangling
between equity and other FDI is possible, the results are equivalent. Comparing columns
(3) and (4), it stands out that banking sector reforms have a signiﬁcant positive impact
on both categories.
In column (5), considering overall FDI data from the UNCTAD database and includ-
ing 52 observations, we see a highly positive eﬀect of banking sector reforms and deeper
banking sectors on net FDI inﬂows. Also, the eﬀect of privatisation is positive and signif-
icant (at the 1% level). Comparing columns (6) and (7), it is striking that the banking
sector reform coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant for the other (thus greenﬁeld) component of
FDI. Thus, banking sector reforms might be more beneﬁcial in the long-run as they not
only lead to changes of ownership from domestic to foreign investors, but also encourage
greenﬁeld investments, leading to the development and expansion of new enterprises in
the host countries.
Given the well-known presence of foreign banks in the region, it would be interesting
to further distinguish between banking FDI and non-banking FDI ﬂows. However, these
data are not available for our sample of countries. Campos and Kinoshita (2008), using
a diﬀerent methodology and an approximative approach in order to distinguish between
19Due to data availability, this graph runs only until 2005.
20See Section 2.2 for details.
12gross ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial FDI inﬂows, report that ﬁnancial liberalisation has a
uniformly positive eﬀect on gross FDI inﬂows in the transition economies of Eastern
Europe.
Overall, our ﬁndings (once we controll for FDI-speciﬁc structural indicators) show that
banking sector reforms tend to work best in attracting greenﬁeld net inﬂows, and to a
lesser extent M&A transactions.
Although the inclusion of additional structural transition indicators stems from the
FDI literature, it is possible that these factors also have an impact on net ﬁnancial ﬂows
in the other investment categories. We examine this issue in Table 6. As for FDI, we
observe for overall net inﬂows a signiﬁcantly negative (at the 10% level) eﬀect of corporate
governance reforms. Apart from this, the only signiﬁcant eﬀect of the transition indicators
is found for infrastructure reforms, with a positive sign on portfolio equity. Moreover, the
main results of Table 3 persist. Additionally, the respective R2s of the estimations used
for Table 3 are higher than in Table 6 (except for FDI), suggesting that the speciﬁcation
is indeed more appropriate only for FDI.
4.1.4 Gross Flows
Importantly, net inﬂows are merely the diﬀerence between capital inﬂows and outﬂows.
Hence, we analyse these separately in Table 7.
We observe that the ﬁscal balance aﬀects both inﬂows and outﬂows positively. The
existing stock of foreign liabilities plays a negative role implying that countries which
have already accumulated a high foreign liability position receive less inﬂows. A higher
dependency ratio and international trade aﬀect inﬂows and outﬂows positively.
Turning to the ﬁnancial variables, we ﬁnd that banking reforms signiﬁcantly increase
ﬁnancial inﬂows, but not ﬁnancial outﬂows, hence explaining the overall positive impact
on net inﬂows. For security market reforms, we ﬁnd that a higher level of reforms implies
less inﬂows (signiﬁcant at the 5% level). Stock market capitalisation has a positive impact
on gross inﬂows and outﬂows, hinting at complementarity of investing domestically and
abroad if the domestic stock market is more developed.
To conclude the medium-term analysis, we ﬁnd that current account balances decrease
with banking sector reforms (and consequently, net ﬁnancial inﬂows increase). Moreover,
we observe FDI and other investment inﬂows to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by banking sector
reforms. Gross ﬁnancial inﬂows are positively aﬀected by banking sector reforms, whereas
there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on outﬂows.
4.2 Annual Data
In our annual data estimation, we use the same set of regressors as in the medium-term
analysis. However, it is important to note that next to the NFA position, we include GDP
growth as well as the reform variables in lagged form. This is in particular relevant for the
reform variables since the political economy perspective on ﬁnancial reforms suggests that
more ﬁnancial inﬂows can trigger ﬁnancial reforms. While this is less of a problem over
13medium-term horizons, we include the lag of the reforms index in these annual estimations
in order to avoid potential endogeneity issues.
Looking at the standard determinants of current accounts, the ﬁscal balance again
signiﬁcantly increases current account surpluses. In contrast to other ﬁndings in the
literature (for example Chinn and Prasad, 2003), we ﬁnd the lagged NFA position to de-
crease current account balances signiﬁcantly. This indicates that countries which already
have relatively high net liability positions are still able to run persistent current account
deﬁcits. This could be a result of the transition process of these countries as they need
more external ﬁnancing in their catching-up process. Also, GDP per capita has a nega-
tive sign, indicating that countries attract more ﬁnancial inﬂows with increasing economic
development.
The overall ﬁnancial reforms index signiﬁcantly lowers current account balances (at the
1% level). Thus our previous ﬁnding is also conﬁrmed at the annual level: a higher level
of ﬁnancial reforms attracts more foreign capital. Distinguishing between banking sector
and security market reforms, we ﬁnd signﬁcant values only for banking reforms. We ﬁnd
some evidence that ﬁnancial deepening in the banking sector contributes to lower current
account balances, whereas no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found for stock market capitalisation.
Furthermore, we observe a strong residual eﬀect for the countries that joined the European
Union in all estimations.
As in the medium-term estimations, we include a set of additional variables in Table
9. However, the only signiﬁcant eﬀect is found for the Euro Area banking claims variable
(column (5)). This result - consistent with Hermann and Winkler, who estimate annual
regressions - could indicate the beneﬁcial role of ﬁnancial integration of the transition
countries with their core, which is represented by the Euro Area.
In all estimations, the signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the lagged net foreign asset
position stands out. Crucially, the banking reform index has a very signiﬁcant (at the 1%
level) impact on the current account balance in all estimations. Moreover, the residual
eﬀect for the European Union member countries persists, which is further evidence that
the EU provides an institutional system which facilitates additional ﬁnancial integration
beyond what is captured by the variables used in our analysis.21
4.3 Cross-Section
In Table 10, we report the results of the cross-sectional analysis of the current account
equations. We use the same determinants as in the previous sections. In order to gain
two additional countries, we use the years 1996 to 2006 (thus we take averages over the
same period for all countries and variables).
The results are again indicative of the prominent role of the ﬁscal balance; the coeﬃ-
cients almost suggest an equi-proportionate response of the current account balance to the
ﬁscal balance. We do not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant role of the initial net foreign asset
position (that is from the year 1995). The same holds true for the age-dependency ratio,
21As in the medium-term analysis, we run additional robustness tests including systemic ﬁnancial crisis
dummies, a more reﬁned demographic speciﬁcation, and dropping Russia from the sample. These do not
aﬀect any of the main results.
14which is only signiﬁcant in column (5). However, we ﬁnd evidence that more developed
countries (in terms of output per capita) receive less net capital ﬂows. Countries with
faster average GDP growth and more openness to international trade, on the other hand,
run larger current account deﬁcits.
Additionally, we ﬁnd a role for the ﬁnancial variables in the cross-sectional dimension:
while the overall reform index is insigniﬁcant in (1), we clearly observe larger current
account deﬁcits for countries with more reformed banking systems, whereas countries
with more security market reforms tend to run larger current account balances (column
2). This is also suggested in (5) for countries with larger stock markets.
All things considered, we ﬁnd strong evidence of an important role of banking reforms
when analysing the data in a cross-section.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about global current account imbalances.
We analysed the role of ﬁnancial sector developments in generating net capital inﬂows for
Emerging Europe. In a novel approach to the literature on international capital ﬂows, we
include measures of ﬁnancial reforms, ﬁnancial depth, and various indicators of ﬁnancial
integration - thus making it possible to distinguish between various dimensions of ﬁnancial
development. This is of high relevance for understanding why Emerging Europe was able
to receive downhill capital ﬂows, making a faster convergence to the industrial countries
possible.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate the importance of ﬁnancial reforms - banking sector reforms
in particular - in attracting net capital inﬂows for our sample of European transition
countries. In the medium-term analysis, there is no convincing evidence of an impact of
ﬁnancial deepening and integration indicators on net capital inﬂows. We observe very per-
sistent additional capital ﬂows to the new EU members, hinting at the unique institutional
set-up inside the European Union.
Among the diﬀerent investment categories, the importance of FDI and other invest-
ments stands out. For both of these investment classes, we observe beneﬁcial eﬀects of
banking sector reforms. A further in-depth analysis of FDI shows that the banking reform
eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of FDI-speciﬁc variables and works better for greenﬁeld
investments than for mergers and acquisitions.
Distinguishing between gross ﬁnancial inﬂows and outﬂows, we ﬁnd banking sector
reforms to have a positive eﬀect on gross inﬂows. The main medium-term results are
strongly conﬁrmed in annual and cross-sectional estimations.
For future research in this area, it will be worth exploring the separate eﬀects of
ﬁnancial sector reforms and ﬁnancial deepening on net capital ﬂows for other emerging
and developing countries. In particular, Emerging Asia might be an interesting case for
comparison as this region is running - in contrast to Emerging Europe - persistent current
account surpluses. A related approach could be pursued by a further disaggregation of
the data - for example, by employing industry level data - in order to ﬁnd out more about
the diﬀerent channels of ﬁnancial reforms.
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A1 EBRD Financial Reform Scores
Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system.
2 Signiﬁcant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit
or interest rate ceilings.
3 Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential
supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap
reﬁnancing; signiﬁcant lending to private enterprises and signiﬁcant presence of private banks.
4 Signiﬁcant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-functioning
banking competition and eﬀective prudential supervision; signiﬁcant term lending to private en-
terprises; substantial ﬁnancial deepening.
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of
banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive banking
services.
Securities markets and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions
1 Little progress.
2 Formation of securities exchanges, market-makers and brokers; some trading in government
paper and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for the issuance and trad-
ing of securities.
3 Substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises; establishment of independent share
registries, secure clearance and settlement procedures, and some protection of minority share-
holders; emergence of non-bank ﬁnancial institutions (for example, investment funds, private
insurance and pension funds, leasing companies) and associated regulatory framework.
4 Securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO standards; substantial market liquid-
ity and capitalisation; well-functioning non-bank ﬁnancial institutions and eﬀective regulation.
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of
securities laws and regulations with IOSCO standards; fully developed non-bank intermediation.
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2008)
20A2 Country Sample
Country Group Data Availability
Bulgaria CEE 12 years
Czech Republic CEE 12 years
Estonia CEE 12 years
Hungary CEE 12 years
Latvia CEE 12 years
Lithuania CEE 12 years
Poland CEE 12 years
Romania CEE 12 years
Slovak Republic CEE 12 years
Slovenia CEE 12 years
Belarus CIS 12 years
Kazakhstan CIS 12 years
Kyrgyz Republic CIS 12 years
Moldova CIS 12 years
Russia CIS 12 years
Ukraine CIS 12 years
Uzbekistan CIS 12 years
Albania SEE 12 years
Macedonia SEE 12 years
Azerbaijan CIS 11 years









A3 Other Data & Sources
Variables Source
Current Account Balance IMF-IFS
Financial Inﬂows and Outﬂows IMF-IFS and IMF-BOPS
Fiscal Balance EBRD
FDI Flows UNCTAD
(Net) External Position Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Age-Dependency Ratio WDI
GDP per Capita WDI
Trade WDI
GDP Growth EBRD
Bank Reform Index EBRD
Security Markets Reform Index EBRD
Structural Transition Indicators EBRD
Stock Market Capitalisation Datastream, S&Ps
Bank Deposits IFS
Capital Account Openness Chinn and Ito (2008)
Foreign Banking World Bank (Claessens et al. (2008))
Bank Claims BIS
Financial Crises Laeven and Valencia (2008)
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Table 1: Medium-term Current Account Determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal Balance 0.499 0.492 0.557 0.457 0.593
[0.192]** [0.171]*** [0.210]** [0.166]*** [0.186]***
L. NFA 0.030 0.028 -0.001 0.032 0.000
[0.032] [0.028] [0.029] [0.026] [0.028]
Dependency Ratio -0.042 -0.061 0.000 0.111 0.133
[0.122] [0.109] [0.111] [0.119] [0.114]
Log GDP per Capita 0.018 0.021 0.038 0.018 0.032
[0.021] [0.019] [0.017]** [0.017] [0.018]*
Trade -0.065 -0.056 -0.061 -0.012 -0.021
[0.020]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.020] [0.020]
GDP Growth -0.291 -0.268 -0.293 -0.120 -0.168
[0.207] [0.184] [0.192] [0.181] [0.172]
Reform Index -0.116
[0.064]*
Bank Reform Index -0.219 -0.207 -0.159
[0.052]*** [0.056]*** [0.055]***
Security Markets Reform Index 0.120 -0.074 -0.018
[0.053]** [0.061] [0.061]
Bank Deposits 0.030 0.059
[0.051] [0.046]
Stock Market Cap 0.073 0.080
[0.062] [0.059]
Size (log Population) 0.024 0.018
[0.005]*** [0.006]***
EU membership -0.040 -0.036 -0.034 -0.048 -0.039
[0.024] [0.022] [0.023] [0.021]** [0.020]*
R-squared 0.47 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.67
Observations 76 76 76 76 76
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Time period: 1995-2006.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
25Table 2: Additional Medium-term Current Account Determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal Balance 0.569 0.517 0.436 0.497 0.598
[0.204]*** [0.200]** [0.186]** [0.185]*** [0.194]***
L. NFA 0.008 0.000 -0.020 -0.005 -0.001
[0.028] [0.035] [0.033] [0.031] [0.028]
Dependency Ratio 0.121 0.323 0.150 0.143 0.139
[0.094] [0.141]** [0.103] [0.104] [0.106]
Log GDP per Capita 0.031 0.045 0.027 0.025 0.033
[0.015]** [0.020]** [0.016] [0.016] [0.015]**
Trade -0.023 0.001 -0.011 -0.004 -0.020
[0.018] [0.023] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]
GDP Growth -0.160 -0.208 -0.063 -0.100 -0.171
[0.161] [0.213] [0.164] [0.170] [0.166]
Bank Reform Index -0.164 -0.133 -0.111 -0.104 -0.159
[0.055]*** [0.067]* [0.049]** [0.052]* [0.056]***
Security Markets Reform Index -0.011 -0.055 -0.033 -0.031 -0.017
[0.056] [0.083] [0.056] [0.062] [0.061]
Bank Deposits 0.053 0.048 0.099 0.058 0.061
[0.047] [0.055] [0.049]** [0.043] [0.045]
Stock Market Cap 0.067 0.138 0.006 0.042 0.079
[0.071] [0.072]* [0.073] [0.068] [0.068]
Size (log Population) 0.018 0.020 0.027 0.025 0.018
[0.006]*** [0.008]** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]***
EU membership -0.040 -0.036 -0.042 -0.045 -0.037





Foreign Bank Share -0.069
[0.040]*
Foreign Bank Asset Share -0.021
[0.030]
EU Bank Claims -0.006
[0.034]
Observations 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.67
R-squared 76 60 72 72 76
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Time period: 1995-2006.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
26Table 3: Medium-term Net Financial Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Current Account Net Inﬂows
Overall P. Equity FDI P. Debt Other
Fiscal Balance 0.593 0.256 -0.137 -0.037 0.200 -0.313 0.367
[0.188]*** [0.149]* [0.178] [0.058] [0.121] [0.112]*** [0.170]**
L. NFA 0.000 -0.037 0.053 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.020
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026]* [0.011] [0.023] [0.017] [0.026]
Dependency Ratio 0.133 -0.113 0.179 0.003 0.070 -0.081 0.421
[0.098] [0.107] [0.132] [0.023] [0.076] [0.050] [0.122]***
Log GDP per Capita 0.032 0.048 -0.038 -0.005 -0.024 0.005 0.010
[0.015]** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.005] [0.010]** [0.008] [0.013]
Trade -0.021 -0.024 0.047 0.003 0.030 0.007 0.010
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018]** [0.004] [0.010]*** [0.008] [0.019]
GDP Growth -0.168 -0.022 -0.071 -0.019 0.048 -0.026 0.129
[0.160] [0.140] [0.160] [0.032] [0.109] [0.072] [0.118]
Bank Reform Index -0.159 -0.156 0.191 0.014 0.162 -0.004 0.063
[0.055]*** [0.045]*** [0.042]*** [0.012] [0.031]*** [0.028] [0.036]*
Sec. Mark. Ref. Index -0.018 -0.071 0.066 0.015 -0.050 0.030 -0.016
[0.059] [0.052] [0.052] [0.012] [0.036] [0.024] [0.047]
Bank Deposits 0.059 0.036 -0.108 -0.008 0.056 -0.026 -0.047
[0.042] [0.039] [0.040]*** [0.011] [0.029]* [0.025] [0.037]
Stock Market Cap 0.080 0.118 -0.026 0.012 -0.070 -0.020 0.039
[0.067] [0.045]** [0.048] [0.015] [0.030]** [0.028] [0.042]
Size (log Population) 0.018 0.015 -0.008 -0.001 0.011 0.001 -0.009
[0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]* [0.001] [0.004]*** [0.003] [0.004]*
EU membership -0.039 -0.037 0.051 -0.011 0.003 -0.008 0.036
[0.023]* [0.017]** [0.021]** [0.005]** [0.013] [0.010] [0.020]*
R-squared 0.67 0.74 0.67 0.32 0.51 0.31 0.58
Observations 76 72 72 66 72 66 72
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Time period: 1995-2006.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
27Table 4: Medium-term Net FDI Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Equity Other Overall M&A Other
Fiscal Balance 0.283 0.087 0.195 0.247 0.127 0.120
[0.138]** [0.118] [0.109]* [0.160] [0.143] [0.140]
L. NFA -0.008 0.015 -0.015 -0.010 0.002 -0.012
[0.025] [0.024] [0.014] [0.033] [0.020] [0.026]
Dependency Ratio 0.050 -0.032 0.082 0.476 0.506 -0.030
[0.084] [0.072] [0.061] [0.240]* [0.317] [0.278]
Log GDP per Capita -0.016 -0.021 0.001 -0.061 0.011 -0.072
[0.011] [0.011]* [0.006] [0.028]** [0.028] [0.025]***
Trade 0.034 0.026 0.011 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003
[0.011]*** [0.011]** [0.006]* [0.015] [0.011] [0.013]
GDP Growth -0.101 -0.162 0.032 0.090 -0.218 0.308
[0.134] [0.102] [0.114] [0.125] [0.162] [0.153]*
Bank Reform Index 0.170 0.108 0.063 0.218 0.091 0.127
[0.034]*** [0.026]*** [0.016]*** [0.068]*** [0.048]* [0.047]**
Sec. Mark. Ref. Index -0.078 -0.020 -0.044 -0.102 -0.092 -0.010
[0.040]* [0.030] [0.026] [0.057]* [0.053]* [0.052]
Bank Deposits 0.039 0.043 -0.007 0.215 0.096 0.120
[0.030] [0.026] [0.015] [0.046]*** [0.042]** [0.038]***
Stock Market Cap -0.078 -0.069 -0.014 -0.043 -0.050 0.008
[0.032]** [0.028]** [0.022] [0.043] [0.047] [0.043]
Size (log Population) 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.001
[0.004]*** [0.003]* [0.003]*** [0.006] [0.005]* [0.005]
EU membership 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.002
[0.014] [0.013] [0.009] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017]
R-squared 0.53 0.52 0.32 0.68 0.40 0.58
Observations 64 64 64 52 52 52
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Time period: 1995-2006.
FDI data retrieved from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics (columns 1 to 3) and from UNCTAD (columns 4 to 6).
* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
28Table 5: Medium-term Net FDI Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Overall Overall Equity Other Overall M&A Other
Fiscal Balance 0.138 0.199 0.109 0.102 0.268 0.061 0.207
[0.103] [0.125] [0.123] [0.088] [0.145]* [0.133] [0.114]*
Log GDP per Capita -0.023 -0.020 -0.014 -0.007 -0.122 -0.037 -0.085
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]** [0.005] [0.019]*** [0.025] [0.022]***
Trade 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.008 -0.027 -0.015 -0.013
[0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]** [0.006] [0.016]* [0.014] [0.016]
GDP Growth 0.044 -0.050 -0.163 0.078 -0.177 -0.287 0.111
[0.093] [0.136] [0.111] [0.100] [0.182] [0.164]* [0.189]
Bank Reform Index 0.133 0.160 0.081 0.079 0.189 0.036 0.153
[0.046]*** [0.059]*** [0.039]** [0.043]* [0.058]*** [0.053] [0.046]***
Sec. Mark. Ref. Index -0.010 -0.031 -0.041 0.013 -0.010 -0.030 0.020
[0.044] [0.050] [0.040] [0.029] [0.055] [0.050] [0.050]
Bank Deposits 0.073 0.059 0.051 0.004 0.205 0.082 0.123
[0.029]** [0.032]* [0.029]* [0.018] [0.039]*** [0.037]** [0.032]***
Stock Market Cap -0.101 -0.095 -0.071 -0.027 -0.051 -0.056 0.005
[0.031]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]** [0.022] [0.046] [0.050] [0.047]
Size (log Population) 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.000
[0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]* [0.002]* [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Infrastructure 0.018 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.009 -0.007
[0.011] [0.014] [0.010] [0.008] [0.013] [0.010] [0.011]
Privatisation 0.074 0.059 0.001 0.052 0.306 0.149 0.158
[0.049] [0.054] [0.037] [0.040] [0.083]*** [0.084]* [0.072]**
Corporate Governance -0.037 -0.032 -0.001 -0.029 -0.024 -0.009 -0.015
[0.017]** [0.018]* [0.015] [0.015]* [0.018] [0.015] [0.017]
EU membership 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.003 -0.007 0.009
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.010] [0.018] [0.016] [0.018]
R-squared 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.36 0.76 0.40 0.62
Observations 72 64 64 64 52 52 52
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Time period: 1995-2006.
FDI data retrieved from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics (columns 1 to 4) and from UNCTAD (columns 5 to 7).
* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
29Table 6: Medium-term Net Financial Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall P. Equity FDI P. Debt Other
Fiscal Balance -0.244 -0.035 0.138 -0.234 0.100
[0.189] [0.054] [0.103] [0.095]** [0.209]
Log GDP per Capita -0.024 0.000 -0.023 0.011 0.001
[0.011]** [0.002] [0.007]*** [0.005]** [0.011]
Trade 0.034 0.002 0.029 0.011 -0.013
[0.016]** [0.004] [0.009]*** [0.008] [0.017]
GDP Growth -0.012 -0.016 0.044 -0.080 0.305
[0.172] [0.033] [0.093] [0.061] [0.146]**
Bank Reform Index 0.192 -0.005 0.133 -0.012 0.074
[0.060]*** [0.016] [0.046]*** [0.039] [0.066]
Sec. Mark. Ref. Index 0.076 0.001 -0.010 0.026 0.012
[0.059] [0.017] [0.044] [0.037] [0.062]
Bank Deposits -0.082 -0.004 0.073 -0.024 -0.071
[0.041]* [0.010] [0.029]** [0.025] [0.039]*
Stock Market Cap -0.044 0.008 -0.101 -0.013 -0.003
[0.049] [0.018] [0.031]*** [0.030] [0.052]
Size (log Population) -0.011 -0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.013
[0.005]** [0.002] [0.003]** [0.003] [0.005]***
Infrastructure 0.004 0.005 0.018 -0.004 -0.012
[0.016] [0.002]* [0.011] [0.008] [0.018]
Privatisation 0.050 0.010 0.074 0.020 0.028
[0.078] [0.016] [0.049] [0.040] [0.074]
Corporate Governance -0.037 -0.003 -0.037 0.001 -0.004
[0.020]* [0.006] [0.017]** [0.014] [0.023]
EU membership 0.054 -0.013 0.007 -0.008 0.038
[0.019]*** [0.005]** [0.013] [0.010] [0.019]*
R-squared 0.65 0.30 0.57 0.30 0.48
Observations 72 66 72 66 72
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Time period: 1995-2006.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
30Table 7: Medium-term Financial Inﬂows and Outﬂows
(1) (2)
Inﬂows Outﬂows
Fiscal Balance 0.652 0.466
[0.272]** [0.239]*
L. Foreign Liabilities -0.045
[0.022]**
L. Foreign Assets -0.029
[0.034]
Dependency Ratio 0.819 0.498
[0.163]*** [0.147]***




GDP Growth 0.194 -0.012
[0.200] [0.132]
Bank Reform Index 0.312 0.064
[0.053]*** [0.048]
Security Markets Reform Index -0.128 -0.073
[0.058]** [0.069]
Bank Deposits 0.038 -0.002
[0.053] [0.038]
Stock Market Cap 0.133 0.217
[0.072]* [0.079]***
Size (log Population) 0.004 0.005
[0.006] [0.006]




Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Time period: 1995-2006.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
31Table 8: Annual Current Account Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal Balance 0.239 0.234 0.216 0.226 0.205
[0.104]** [0.102]** [0.101]** [0.110]** [0.102]**
L. NFA -0.074 -0.069 -0.065 -0.068 -0.066
[0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.024]*** [0.026]*** [0.024]***
Dependency Ratio -0.174 -0.215 -0.187 -0.139 -0.092
[0.227] [0.223] [0.211] [0.238] [0.218]
Log GDP per Capita -0.120 -0.122 -0.107 -0.110 -0.090
[0.036]*** [0.036]*** [0.037]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]**
Trade -0.027 -0.027 -0.025 -0.030 -0.026
[0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.026] [0.025]
L. GDP Growth 0.003 0.009 0.020 0.021 0.033
[0.057] [0.057] [0.056] [0.059] [0.058]
L. Reform Index -0.160
[0.046]***
L. Bank Reform Index -0.129 -0.134 -0.120
[0.037]*** [0.036]*** [0.037]***
L. Security Markets Reform Index -0.035 -0.050 -0.041
[0.035] [0.036] [0.035]
Bank Deposits -0.092 -0.092
[0.051]* [0.050]*
Stock Market Cap 0.024 0.025
[0.041] [0.040]
Size (log Population) 0.246 0.146
[0.176] [0.163]
EU membership -0.049 -0.048 -0.051 -0.048 -0.050
[0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]***
R-squared 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.71
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19
Observations 228 228 228 228 228
Notes: Panel estimation with AR(1) correlated disturbances, panel-corrected heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in
parentheses), and involving country and time ﬁxed eﬀects. R-squared refers to the within-group measure. Time period:
1995-2006. * signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
32Table 9: Additional Annual Current Account Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal Balance 0.205 0.141 0.214 0.275 0.174
[0.101]** [0.114] [0.106]** [0.105]*** [0.104]*
L. NFA -0.053 -0.111 -0.065 -0.056 -0.094
[0.026]** [0.028]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]** [0.027]***
Dependency Ratio -0.017 -0.600 -0.132 -0.233 0.004
[0.221] [0.273]** [0.234] [0.240] [0.219]
Log GDP per Capita -0.093 -0.079 -0.090 -0.086 -0.054
[0.038]** [0.057] [0.038]** [0.040]** [0.040]
Trade -0.022 0.016 -0.036 -0.031 -0.023
[0.024] [0.030] [0.026] [0.026] [0.024]
L. GDP Growth 0.029 -0.107 0.035 0.016 0.007
[0.058] [0.068] [0.060] [0.058] [0.058]
L. Bank Reform Index -0.116 -0.208 -0.115 -0.123 -0.108
[0.037]*** [0.047]*** [0.038]*** [0.037]*** [0.037]***
L. Security Markets Reform Index -0.043 -0.081 -0.023 -0.020 -0.025
[0.034] [0.050] [0.038] [0.039] [0.035]
Bank Deposits -0.090 -0.108 -0.113 -0.053 -0.058
[0.053]* [0.065]* [0.054]** [0.055] [0.053]
Stock Market Cap 0.026 0.050 0.008 -0.055 -0.003
[0.039] [0.042] [0.044] [0.054] [0.042]
Size (log Population) 0.071 -0.052 0.102 -0.031 0.144
[0.165] [0.213] [0.171] [0.180] [0.161]
EU membership -0.050 -0.048 -0.049 -0.047 -0.035





Foreign Bank Share -0.013
[0.031]
Foreign Bank Asset Share -0.016
[0.014]
EU Bank Claims -0.068
[0.023]***
R-squared 0.69 0.80 0.72 0.72 0.72
Number of countries 19 19 18 18 19
Observations 226 177 216 198 228
Notes: Panel estimation with AR(1) correlated disturbances, panel-corrected heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in
parentheses), and involving country and time ﬁxed eﬀects. R-squared refers to the within-group measure. Time period:
1995-2006. * signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
33Table 10: Cross-Sectional Current Account Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal Balance 0.917 0.843 1.183 0.785 1.330
[0.387]** [0.284]** [0.705] [0.337]** [0.464]**
L. NFA 0.005 -0.012 -0.053 0.029 -0.046
[0.069] [0.049] [0.075] [0.039] [0.046]
Dependency Ratio 0.196 0.140 0.284 0.389 0.423
[0.221] [0.165] [0.214] [0.213]* [0.148]**
Log GDP per Capita 0.047 0.045 0.061 0.036 0.040
[0.026]* [0.019]** [0.025]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Trade -0.065 -0.058 -0.059 -0.002 -0.029
[0.035]* [0.031]* [0.026]** [0.034] [0.028]
GDP Growth -1.234 -1.145 -1.192 -0.943 -0.907
[0.416]** [0.231]*** [0.328]*** [0.364]** [0.263]***
Reform Index -0.154
[0.105]
Bank Reform Index -0.288 -0.267 -0.256
[0.107]** [0.084]*** [0.057]***
Security Markets Reform Index 0.152 -0.121 0.033
[0.070]* [0.058]* [0.067]
Bank Deposits 0.094 0.151
[0.122] [0.086]
Stock Market Cap 0.198 0.209
[0.144] [0.078]**
Size (log Population) 0.023 0.010
[0.008]** [0.008]
R-squared 0.61 0.80 0.76 0.79 0.91
Observations 21 21 21 21 21
Notes: Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) using country averages
over 1996-2006. * signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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